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Climate change represents very significant impacts for the natural environment, as well 
as for the economy, health and security of many human communities. The recent report 
of the Global Humanitarian Forum, Climate Change – the Anatomy of a Silent Crisis 
(2009), clearly shows that poverty and extreme vulnerability to climate change are very 
closely associated. Even the rise of only one degree Celsius in average global 
temperatures can provoke famines, mass migrations and threats to public health in 
various parts of the globe.  
The global effects of climate change are especially harmful to the less well-off sectors 
of the world population, which, however, have contributed much less to global warming 
than the better-off sectors. In order to obtain action that will take into account those who 
are most vulnerable to climate change, several factors need to be considered with care. 
Here we will limit ourselves to the introduction of three topics that will require more in-
depth study. 
We begin with a brief assessment of the role of communication and public education 
strategies designed to raise awareness and engage the broad participation of citizens in 
responses to climate change. Next, we take note of the interplay of poverty and climate 
change from the perspective of environmental justice and international governance. 
After this, we propose that development merely be thought of as a matter of economic 
growth, supplemented by consideration through values such as well-being and equity, 
but also in terms of human security. Our conclusion is that, in the time of climate 
change, the increasing vulnerability of marginalised sectors of the world population 
requires that development be addressed in a new way. 
 
Scientific consensus on climate change and public perception 
   The latest report of the IPCC states that “Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal” and that most of the warming over the past half-century is “very likely due 
to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] concentrations” (IPCC, 
2007a, 1, 4). A range of potentially damaging impacts of climate change are anticipated, 
some of which may be abrupt and irreversible, with potentially severe impacts on 
human and natural systems (IPCC, 2007b).  
Social science research on how members of the public from diverse cultural 
backgrounds and scientific literacy levels are likely to use information and reach 
decisions about science should be incorporated in academic and political debates on 
climate change, in order to inform effective public engagement and communication. 
Any science communication efforts need to be based on a systematic empirical 
understanding of an intended audience’s existing values, knowledge, and attitudes, their 
interpersonal and social contexts, and their preferred media sources and communication 
channels (Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009). 
   While the basic science of global warming is relatively simple, the specific processes 
and positive or negative impacts involve considerable uncertainty. The causes and likely 
impacts of climate change for many people currently alive and in the distant future are 
highly complex. This poses a major communication challenge. Public perception studies 
show that people worldwide are concerned about climate change.  
   Communities on the climate frontlines already see the change and suffer its 
consequences. But awareness about the impacts of climate change is low, particularly 
among the poorest people in developing countries, where ninety-nine percent of all 
casualties occur, although only one percent of global emissions is attributable to some 
50 of the least developed nations. 
   In industrialized countries, a large majority of the public feels that climate change is 
indeed occurring, but significant proportions of citizens in both Britain and America 
still do not believe that this is due to human activity, as opposed to 84% of scientists 
surveyed in a recent poll. A third of the general public feels that there is lack of 
scientific consensus on this issue, and less than half feel that it is a very serious problem 
(Pew Research Center, 2009). A previous survey by the Pew Research Center for the 
People & the Press (Pew Research Center, 2008) conducted April 23-27 among 1,502 
adults, found that many people say that rising global temperatures are either mostly 
caused by natural environmental patterns (18%), that they do not know the cause of 
warming (6%), or that no solid evidence of warming exists (21%). As Nisbet and 
Kotcher point out, 
 
“[S]olving the public opinion challenge on climate change means defining or framing the 
complexities of the issue in a way that connects to the specific core values of various publics, but 
it also means reaching these audiences with the carefully crafted message. This is not an easy 
task. The great paradox of today’s media world is that the American public has greater access to 
quality information about climate change than at any time in history, yet public concern remains 
low and citizens remain demobilized” (Nisbet, Kotcher 2009:329). 
 
Following Prior (2005), Nisbet and Kotcher suggest that citizens select media content 
based on ideology, partisanship, and also based on their preference, or lack thereof, for 
public affairs and science-related information. Keller and Berry (2003) point out 
difficulties to reach fragmented audiences and, above all, audiences that are increasingly 
distrustful of both news and advertising. It explains why citizens instead prefer 
recommendations from friends, family, coworkers, and peers. 
 
According to Nisbet and Kotcher, activating concern and catalyzing behavior change 
across key segments of the public depends on establishing the right perceptual context:  
 
“[T]he communication challenge is to shift climate change from the mental box of “uncertain 
science,” an “unfair economic burden,” or a “Pandora’s box” of disaster toward a new cognitive 
reference point that connects to something the specific intended audience already values or 
understands. As recent examples, several campaigns recast climate change as an opportunity to 
grow the economy through the development of clean-energy technology or the creation of 
“green-collar jobs;” other campaigns redefine climate change as a matter of public health or 
moral and religious duty. Campaign organizers need to draw on focus groups, in-depth 
interviews, experiments, and surveys to identify and test different frames across population 
segments or relative to a targeted specialized audience” (Nisbet, Kotcher 2009:338). 
 
Many concepts, measures, and strategies can be applied to improve the efficacy of 
opinion-leader campaigns on climate change, in order to catalyze wider political 
engagement on the issue and to promote sustainable consumer choices and behaviors. 
But public perception studies show that climate change is still considered a distant 
threat that might affect our future, although the effects of pollution driven by economic 
growth in some parts of the rich world are now driving millions of people into poverty 
elsewhere. So, important questions of distributive justice and environmental equity 
arise, affecting also future generations interests. 
 
Environmental justice and democratic governance  
   Poor people lack of capacity to make their voices heard in international fora, but 
climate change is an all encompassing threat, affecting directly the environment, the 
economy, health and safety. Many communities face multiple stresses with serious 
social, political and security implications. New climate policy must empower vulnerable 
communities and help to harmonize basic democratic values (e.g., participation, 
deliberation) with the challenges raised by global warming. The world’s poorest 
communities who suffer most from climate change are least responsible for greenhouse 
gas emissions. Therefore, the global framework needed to address climate change must 
be based on the principles of fairness and equity. 
   At the international level, climate policy is now moving rapidly towards agreeing on 
an emissions pathway, and distributing responsibilities between countries. A new 
framework is needed, in which each country takes on its own responsibilities and 
targets, based on a shared understanding of the risks and the need for action and 
collaboration on climate change (Hepburn, Stern 2008:259). The concepts of democracy 
and justice, commonly theorized in a national context, do not play similar roles when 
applied to trans-national contexts of problems (Lidskog, Elander 2009). Issues such as 
long-range air pollution, resource depletion caused by international systems of 
production, and humanity’s dependence on a shared biosphere, are good examples of 
environmental trans-boundary problems that demand concerted political action. 
Although these issues have been dealt with through negotiations between nation-states, 
in the case of climate change, doubts have been raised about whether this handling is 
suitable: 
 
“Poor nation-states fear that international agreements will limit their attempt for economic 
growth whereas economic powerful nation-states refuse to make substantial reduction of their 
GHG emission if developing countries do not make a similar sacrifice. Thus, climate change 
involves fundamental aspects of global justice, which create policy gridlocks for climate change 
policies. 
[…]The challenge of defining and developing structures for political action beyond the nation-
state –capable of dealing with larger issues of global inequalities and environmental justice– is 
one that is far from being successfully met.” (Lidskog, Elander 2009:2-3). 
 
   Some authors question if representative democracy in the territorially bounded 
organization of the nation-state can effectively handle trans-boundary, complex and 
controversial issues (Held, Koenig-Archibugi 2005). If the political system fails to 
develop a capacity to handle the climate issue in a democratic way, scientific and 
technocratic dictates could supersede its role to respond to this challenge. Lidskog and 
Elander (2009) consider that addressing climate change in a way that meets acceptable 
criteria of democracy requires a broad understanding of the potentials and limitations 
offered by the emerging multi-level governance system. They identify four challenges 
that ecology poses to democracy: justice between different regions of the world, justice 
between generations, the value of non-human species, and assessment of the role of 
scientific knowledge and expertise in decision making. Finally, they argue that three 
fundamental democratic mechanisms, namely representation, participation and 
deliberation, must be heeded when considering how to respond to climate change, 
giving due respect to the basic values of democracy.  
   The current lack of coherence among the various environmental justice constructs can 
only perpetuate the atmosphere of endless chaotic theorisation with no positive effect on 
the evolution of a consensus. According to Ikeme, the environmental justice construct 
has distributive and procedural dimensions, can be rationalised by both deontological 
and consequentialist arguments, and can be compartmentalised from preventive, 
corrective and retributive perspectives (Ikeme, 2003). Ikeme identifies three major 
environmental justice and equity issues facing the climate change debate: distribution of 
impacts; distribution of responsibility; and distribution of costs and benefits. But North 
and the South act on different conceptions of equity and environmental justice in 
confronting this issue: the South has focused on equality, distributive injustice and 
corrective justice for historical emissions, while the North focuses mainly on the most 
economically efficient path for minimising climate impact and delivering global 
ecological health and stability. As a result, the North and the South broadly subscribe to 
opposing burden sharing formulas. These incomplete and, in many instances, competing 
conceptions of environmental justice mark the dividing line in the North–South climate 
politics (Ikeme, 2003:200).  
   The South seeks increased participation in the climate change response process 
arguing that fairness or equitability of an outcome rests on the legitimacy of the process 
by which it is determined. According to Rawls (1972), a fair bargaining would always 
produce a fair result, but it requires broad-based participation. The procedural justice 
requirement of equity asserts that the distribution of costs and benefits of the 
atmospheric resources can only be equitable if it results from a process that is agreed 
upon by all parties. However, to date, climate negotiations have been less about 
protecting the global environment than about protecting national interests.  
   The overriding Northern conception of environmental justice has been largely 
consequentialist, geared towards ensuring the most economically efficient path for 
minimising climate impact (Neumayer, 2000) and emphasising the rightness or 
effectiveness of the outcome rather than the justness of the steps towards it. Welfare 
principles dominate Northern conception of environmental justice. The Northern 
condition for environmental justice in the climate protection point to costs and benefits 
sharing, minimising overall costs while maximising total welfare across the globe. The 
strategy would thus focus on reducing emissions where it is most cost effective and 
where the greatest opportunity for emission reduction obtains.  
   However, both the consequentialist and deontological moral positions adopted by the 
North and South reach the same conclusion: greater burdens for climate protection 
should be borne by the North, and North–South transfer of resources should be used to 
facilitate climate protection and adaptation in the South. This is far away from Rawls’s 
position, who assumes that peoples from different cultures do not possess the (non-
political) cultural common ground to “construct” a just cosmopolitan order. Explicitly 
motivated by questions of development in the Global South, Martha Nussbaum, 
Amartya Sen and Seyla Benhabib have recently attempted to construct a universalistic 
philosophy of “human capabilities” that we could consider the middle ground between 
Rawls and the cosmopolitanism of Pogge, Singer and Beitz (Doyle, 2006:119). 
 
Development and human security 
 
Human security 
A few years ago the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP) designated 
Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) as a core project. Though 
an evolving concept, in this context human security is primarily understood as “the 
freedom to take actions that promote wellbeing in response to changing environmental 
conditions.” (GECHS 2009a) More specifically, “human security is a state that is 
achieved when and where individuals and communities have the options necessary to 
end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights; have 
the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in pursuing 
these options.” (emphasis added, GECHS 2009b) Human security, in other words, 
entails not only an end state, described in terms of an increase in wellbeing and a 
decrease in certain threats, but also a particular way of achieving this end state, in terms 
of the capacity for active participation in this process on the part of individuals and 
communities.  
As such, the definition of human security is explicitly normative in a double sense, 
since it does not only draw attention to the end state to be achieved, but also to the 
importance of the capacity to act on one’s own behalf. The capacity to direct one’s own 
life according to one’s own choices is widely considered as one of the key elements that 
give human life intrinsic value (Kant 1785/2002).  Hence, insofar as climate change is a 
threat, not only to health, life and livelihood, but also to the ability of vulnerable 
populations to actively respond to these matters according to their own choices, it 
implies a double, ethical imperative for action. When this concept is applied to 
development in times of climate change, it has some important consequences. 
First, it shifts attention from the ‘classical’ goals of development, such as bringing 
less industrialised nations closer to the standard of living of fully industrialised nations. 
The key focus, required by the notion of human security, is to bring about conditions so 
that vulnerable populations may overcome in a satisfactory  way the threats that arise 
from global environmental change. Second, it demands that the conditions to be 
pursued be such that vulnerable populations may themselves be actively involved in 
mastering the threats to their lives, livelihoods and general wellbeing. 
 
Development and ‘maldevelopment’ 
As Vandana Shiva has conclusively argued, much development in the post-colonical 
world really is ‘maldevelopment’, based on conceptions of progress and poverty that are 
modelled on European and North American patterns (REFERENCE). As such, these 
extraneous models of development often increase vulnerability of the least secure 
populations, even if it allows minorities to acquire standards of living comparable to 
those in the developed world. Despite critiques such as Shiva’s, development schemes 
that weaken the least well off continue to be applied, often under pressure from an 
international banking system that demands repayment of accumulated interest and debt 
from debtor countries. 
The latest symptom of misguided approaches to development may be seen in the 
collaboration of governments from the developing world with countries from the more 
industrialised and oil-rich world, such as South Korea and Saudi Arabia, as well as with 
large, multinational corporations, in the acquisition of immense areas of land for future 
cash crops to be sold on the world market. A third of the Congo Brazzaville territory, 
for example, has been leased to white South African farmers for the duration of 90 years 
(Peinado Alcaraz 2009, Berger 2009). Similarly, in Madagascar the Indian company 
Varun has gained control over 232,000 hectars of agricultural land (Tany/Madagascar 
Tribune 2009), while the South Korean corporation Daewoo expects to obtain rights to 
1,3 million hectares if its contract is deemed acceptable by the Parliament of that 
country (Coalition Paysanne 2009). It is reported that the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, which is a think-tank based in Washington D.C., estimates “that 
since 2006, 15-20 million hectares of land in poor countries had been sold or were 
under negotiations for sale to foreign buyers.” (Kovalyova 2009). These large-scale 
acquisitions of control over land is a trend that has received its most recent impetus after 
the world food price crisis in 2007-08, and can be expected to become more pronounced 
as world population grows, oil prices start climbing again, and ‘emerging’ countries 
such as China and India continue to increase in meat consumption.
1
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), moreover, though cautious, still 
advocates further mechanisation of the agricultural sector, on the assumption that this 
process will contribute to the satisfation of the demand for food of a growing global 
population, even while it acknowledges that mechanisation has been an important 
source of rural un- and under-employment. The result in the past has been that 
increasingly large numbers of rural people have been reduced to poverty and forced to 
migrate into urban centres where they swell the ranks of the needy. Even while it may 
be granted that growing populations will require growth in total quantity of foodstuffs, 
too little thought is still devoted to the question how displaced rural populations are to 
afford the food that is produced by supposedly more efficient production methods. 
An emphasis on human security in the time of climate change, however, requires that 
development models be thought through afresh so that the capacity of individuals and 
communities for securing their lives, livelihoods and wellbeing not be hindered by 
development schemes focused on goals that serve the non-vital interests of populations 
in generally better-off countries, or the interests of financial gain of large corporations at 
their expense. A case in point, which illustrates a particularly harsh result of such 
misguided development schemes, comes from the African Sahel.  
Analysis of the devastating Sahel famine of the 1970s confirms an unfortunate 
conjunction of misguided notions of development, founded on the goals of rapid 
economic growth, and a failure in understanding decadal variability of climatic patterns 
(Heyd and Brooks 2008).  The development scheme applied in the area involved the 
introduction of commercial agriculture and the consequent displacement and 
marginalisation of pastoralists. These processes undermined traditional ways of coping 
with drought periods with the effect that, after several unusually wet years, large 
numbers of people and animals became vulnerable, and eventually succumbed, to the 
impact of the severe 1972-73 drought that followed. 
Human security demands that the capacity for agency of individuals and communities 
be safeguarded. This implies that models for development of the less industrialised 
world be reconsidered. Instead of focusing on abstractions of economics, such as total 
amount of food produced within a country and what it can earn in cash on the world 
markets, the focus should be on total number of people who are resilient to threats to 
wellbeing, such as brought about by climate change, and on their capacity to take an 
active part in procuring their own safety in terms of adaptation and coping. 
                                                 
1
 Supposedly the United Nations is planning to regulate such massive transfers of 
agricultural lands, but this is not due to happen at least for the next two years. The 
purchase of farmlands in developing countries is said to have slowed down during the 
present economic crisis (Kovalyova 2009), but can be expected to pick up speed as soon 
as money becomes available again. 
Obviously such a shift in foci for development means that there be a shift in agents 
that should be supported. Rather than supporting those elements of global society that 
appear to be most efficient in the production of food, through capital-intensive inputs 
designed to fetch the best returns on the global markedt, the emphasis would be on 
those elements that can be most relevant to local self-sufficiency and more contributory 
to autonomous management of local resources. Since agricultural production in most 
countries is a community affair that requires the cooperation and agreement of 
community members, support likely should therefore generally be pitched at the 
community level. Vandana Shiva herself has given a powerful example in how this can 
be done through her support of the Navdanya network of seed keepers and organic food 
producers spread across villages in India (Navdanya 2009) 
 
Conclusion 
We conclude that development in the context of climate change requires attention to at 
least three factors: Clear communication strategies of scientific findings designed to 
engage populations in action, attention to environmental justice in relation to 
international governance, and a shift in focus from development for economic growth to 
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